and inexplicably resisted the deeper truths of Augustinian theology. But after investigating Augustine's views in the Pelagian controversy and those of his opponents, I concluded. . . that even his admirers would do well to reassess and qualify Augustine's singular dominance in much of Western Christian history."
The present essay will concentrate primarily on an area of Augustine's thought that Pagels did not take up but which may be considered equally in need of reassessment and which is, I would like to suggest, more closely connected than it might at first appear with the issues at stake in his doctrine of Original Sin: his approach to the doctrine of the Trinity by way of an analogy to the structure of the human mind.
This "psychological analogy," as it is commonly called, is also coming to be recognized as a distinctly innovative approach which led to a radically original interpretation of that doctrine. Augustine's own subsequent tradition denied that originality, of course, since it claimed that his version of the doctrine of the Trinity was merely a clarification of prior Trinitarian thinking, and even historical scholars tended until recently to give credit to the earlier Latin thinker, Marius Victorinus (fl. 361), for developing the psychological analogy in trinitarian speculation. More recent historians, on the other hand, are inclined to credit Augustine with radical originality here as well, 2 even if that originality may be due in part to failures of understanding. 2 Peter Manchester, for example, has said that Augustine perhaps did not even know, and in any case did not understand Victorinus's conception of the Trinity. "The Noetic Triad in Plotinus, Marius Victorinus, and Augustine," in Neoplatonism and Gnosticism, ed. Richard T. Wallis and Jay Bregman, Studies in Neoplatonism: Ancient and Modern 6 (New York: SUNY Press, forthcoming).
Since this essay is intended as a contribution to a volume on the nature of religious innovation, and therefore, to a certain extent at least, on the nature of originality in religious thinking, it will be appropriate to begin with a few observations regarding some of the ways innovations in religious thought can be said to take place. One way is by reflection on experience: through a genuinely new interpretation of familiar human experience or through reflection on experience that is perceived as being distinctively new in some way. Another is by reflection on the gradually unfolding implications of the symbols and concepts that have subsequently been used to express and interpret such experience.
Augustine's innovations were of the latter sort. His doctrine of Original Sin, for example, was a theory that interpreted in a new way what he believed to be the implications of the sin of Adam and Eve and their expulsion from Eden. His version of the doctrine of the Trinity was similarly an attempt to explain the meaning of ancient Biblical images: the images of God as Father, of the Son of God, and of the Holy Spirit. These images had already taken on a trinitarian meaning earlier in the fourth century in the thinking of such figures as Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nazianzen, and Gregory of Nyssa, and the trinitarianism they developed was declared dogma by ecumenical councils whose authority Augustine accepted. He came to interpret them, however, in a radically new manner: he gave the doctrine a new meaning, attributing to the Trinity as such a fundamentally different structure from that which it had had for the Greek Christian thinkers who originated the doctrine. Also, by centering his thought not on Christian experience of relationship with God but rather on speculative metaphors, he gave preference to a mode of interpretation that implied the impossibility of individual Christians thinking for themselves about theology with any genuine personal authority. This had the effect of making them radically dependent on the pronouncements of ecclesiastical authorities-one of the most important of whom for future generations in the West would, of course, be Augustine himself.
Before moving directly to the discussion of the trinitarian doctrine, therefore, it 4 Stephen McKenna, "Introduction," in The Trinity, trans. Stephen McKenna, C.SS.R (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1963), p. x: "His psychological study of the Trinity. . . has no parallel in the history of Patristic literature." Cf. also George L. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought (London: SPCK, 1952), p. 236: "The wisest of the Latins were fully conscious that the Greek doctrine of the Trinity was essentially different from their own." will be helpful to take a moment to consider briefly the originating experiences out of which pre-Augustinian theological reflection seems to have developed. Pagels has especially emphasized the new sense of moral freedom the early Christians felt. The trinitarianism of the tradition preceding Augustine grew out of the same experiential root. For the earliest Christians one of the striking features of the teaching of Jesus was the special sense of intimate relationship to God that he indicated by his frequent use of the word "Abba,"
5 an intimate and familiar term in Aramaic for "father," which he declared to be a possibility for all who heeded his message and responded to the fatherhood of God.
A similar sense of "sonship" is reflected in the epistles of Paul as well, as when, after speaking of how a Christian shares the life and therefore presumably the experience of Jesus (". . . the life I now live is not my life, but the life which Christ lives in me" [Gal. 2:20] ), he describes that shared experience in the language of sonship and animation by the Holy Spirit: "To prove that you are sons, God has sent into our hearts the Spirit of his Son, crying, 'Abba! Father!' You are therefore no longer a slave but a son, and if a son, then also by God's own act an heir." (Gal. 4:6-7). 6 A major implication of this image of sonship for Paul was the sense of moral freedom indicated by the contrast between "son" and "slave" in this passage. As Pagels points out, this was to become a central theme of Greek patristic reflection. She says that for the Christian tradition before Augustine, the idea of autexousia or the moral freedom to govern oneself was "virtually synonymous with 'the gospel' " (p. 99). Augustine's rejection of this in favor of a belief that all humanity, Christian and non-Christian alike, was irreversibly enslaved to sin in this life was, therefore, a radical innovation.
Pagels considers this innovation to have been closely linked to "the evolution Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1975) .
6 It should be noted that the capitalization of "Son" and "Spirit" here reflects a later theological tradition of interpretation; the original Greek text, which dates from centuries before Byzantine scribes had developed lower case letters in Greek, made no orthographic distinction between the word "sons" as referring to Christians generally and the word "son" as referring to Jesus. The later tradition came increasingly to emphasize the uniqueness of Jesus and his sonship in a way that made his experience of relation to God as father seem radically different in kind from that of his followers, but that is not an assumption necessarily implied in the letters of Paul. Biblical passages are quoted from the New English Bible translation. of the Christian movement from a persecuted sect to the religion of the emperor himself" (p. 97). She does not go into the exact nature of the linkage, but she does suggest that the reason Augustine's originally controversial denial of moral freedom came to be so widely accepted in the West after the Council of Orange in 529 was that "Augustine's theology of the fall made the uneasy alliance between the Catholic churches and imperial power palatable. . . for the majority of Christians" in that it explained why the exercise of coercion among both Christians and non-Christians alike was not only justifiable but necessary (pp. 125-6) . This is probably true as far as it goes, but there seem to have been other important factors as well that produced the special linkage between ecclesiastical and imperial power in the mind of Augustine, and there is good reason to suppose that his doctrines of Original Sin and the Trinity were both closely bound up with them. One such factor that has perhaps not been sufficiently appreciated in reflections on the history of theology is the role of metaphors in the formation of ideas.
Metaphor can function in thinking in a variety of ways. It can be used, for example, to represent in objectivizing language or in terms of objective imagery what is itself intrinsically subjective or spiritual. Bondage and freedom, Father, Son, and Spirit, are all metaphors in this sense. Without metaphor it would be impossible to find voice for the spiritual dimension of experience, and by use of it one hopes to suggest at least indirectly to others the possibility of noticing features of that dimension that would otherwise be incommunicable and would perhaps remain unnoticed and unreflected upon. In this aspect, metaphor is important for theology because it can serve to evoke and to guide individuals and communities toward possibilities of existence of which they might otherwise remain unaware. Used in this manner, metaphor can serve as what Eric Voegelin called "primary symbolism," symbolism, that is, that gives expression to a genuine insight into concrete experience.
7 As a primary symbolism, metaphor functions in the manner of a lens, directing attention through itself toward something that it represents analogically.
Metaphor can also function in a quite different way, however, when it ceases to be transparent and to direct attention to something in experience other than itself. The ancient Roman imperium could not be forgotten any more than Charlemagne's brief decades of hegemony in the west. The Holy Roman Emperors identified with Charlemagne by being crowned and holding court at Aix-laChappelle, a center of political unification. The symbols of spiritual energy still radiated over western Europe from Rome, domiciling the most vivid western reminders of the founding of Christianity. . . .Moreover, Rome continued to haunt Europeans with reminders that it had achieved the grandest ecumenic empire ever. Otto III as emperor and Gerbert of Aurillac as Pope Sylvester II were claiming (by 1000) that they together re-embodied the imperium of Octavianus, the Augustus chosen by God to make last-minute preparations on earth for Christ's incarnation.
9
Clebsch is speaking here of the medieval survival of the image of the Roman empire as a metaphor for the kingdom of God and for the Church, but the same metaphor was just as important a force in the shaping of the Christian tradition in late antiquity once the conversion of Constantine and his Christianization of the empire had made it available for Christian appropriation, and Augustine was one of the most important agents in this process.
The role of such images, and of the institutions associated with them, in forming religious traditions has become more widely appreciated since they began to receive attention from sociologists of knowledge, such as Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann 10 , and from cultural anthropologists, such as Clifford Geertz. "Whatever the ultimate sources of faith of a man or group of men may or may not be," says Geertz,
"it is indisputable that it is sustained in this world by symbolic forms and social arrangements. What a given religion is-its specific content-is embodied in the images and metaphors its adherents use to characterize reality; it makes a great deal of difference whether you call life a dream, a pilgrimage, a labyrinth, or a carnival. But such a religion's career-its historical course-rests in turn upon the institutions which render these images and metaphors available to those who thus employ them." 11 In the development of the Catholic Christian tradition the image of empire was one of the most important of these. "It is really not much easier to conceive of Christianity without Gregory [Bishop of Rome, 590-604] than without Jesus," Geertz adds.
Nor, of course, would it be any easier to conceive of western Christianity without
Augustine, who prepared the ground in the fifth century for what Gregory was to undertake in the sixth, and who not only contributed to that tradition the theory of hereditary sin and of the need of all human beings, including Christians, for stern discipline and therefore for powerful institutions of the sort Gregory forged, but who also what have remained two irreconcilable halves and that was, I would like to suggest, equally connected with the assimilation of ecclesiastical authority to a conceptuality and symbolism of power cast in the imperial mold. The trinitarian symbolism is also equally pertinent, as I hope will become clear, to the theme of moral freedom that Pagels considers to have been so central to early Christianity, and Augustine's revision of it was another major factor in the shift from the earlier belief in moral freedom to that in moral bondage.
I will not attempt here a specific analysis of the controversy over the filioque, the phrase "and the Son" which the West, following Augustine's lead, eventually added to the Nicene Creed and which became the immediate occasion for the controversies that produced the enduring schism between Eastern and Western Christendom. Rather I will be concerned primarily with the underlying pattern of thought of which it became a crystallizing expression. As a theological conception, the interpretation of the Trinity by way of an analogy between God and the structure of human existence may not have been completely original to Augustine, but the crucial idea of the double procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son was strictly his own. Marius Victorinus had suggested that the idea of the Trinity could best be understood by thinking of God as like a union of Being (Father), Living (Son), and Thinking (Spirit).
He did not, however, think of the relations among these as involving the possibility of there being any other source of existence than the Father alone, and in this he remained in accord with the Greek tradition of Trinitarian reflection. Rather, for Victorinus the generation of the Son was to be understood as a single movement producing both Christ and the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit did not "proceed from"
Christ but was "engendered within" him 12 -an image that is actually rather close to what for the Eastern, non-filioquist tradition is the classic formulation by John of Damascus in the seventh century, who interpreted the Orthodox faith of the Greek Fathers and ecumenical councils as believing that the Holy Spirit "proceeds from the 12 Pierre Hadot, Introduction to Victorinus, Traités théologiques sur la Trinité, Latin text edited by Paul Henry with introduction, French translation, and notes by Pierre Hadot (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1960), p. 81. Far from interpreting the Holy Spirit as depending on the Son's causation, Victorinus emphasized that their relationship is reciprocal, even to the point of saying in "Adversus Arium," 1, 56-58, that the Holy Spirit is the "mother" of Christ and as the "thinking" of God constitutes the "first interior movement" (motus primus intus ) within God that in its exteriorization (foris effectam ) engenders the life of the Son (Traités théologiques, p. 364-68).
Father, and abides in the Son."
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In his De Trinitate (ca. 399-415) Augustine worked multiple variations of his own on the possibilities of trinitarian analogy, such as: lover, beloved, and love; the mind, the mind's knowledge of itself, and its love of itself; the eye of the mind, its expression as word, and the will that produces that expression; object, vision, and attention; memory, inner vision, and will; memory, understanding, and love, and so on. He favored especially those triads involving mental faculties and activities, since he thought the human mind, as the highest aspect of the human being, was the closest analogue to the God who made man in his image. It was evidently this that led him to advocate the idea of the procession of the Holy Spirit from both the Father and the Son, as a function of the association of the Son with intelligence and the Spirit with love or will. "The mind cannot love itself," he said, "unless it also knows itself, for how can it love what it does not know?"
14
The reason I say "evidently" is that Augustine himself did not explicitly link his assertion of the double procession to this analogy. His explicit arguments for the double procession are stated in the last book of the work and are rendered rather tentative by the fact that he realizes that a strict application of the analogy of the Son to wisdom and the Spirit to love would imply that the Son alone was wise, and not the Father or Spirit, and that the Spirit alone was loving, and not the Father or Son. There he introduces the topic by saying rather tentatively, "We have spoken sufficiently about the Father and the Son, insofar as we have been able to see through this mirror and in this enigma. Now we are to speak about the Holy Spirit, insofar as God the Giver shall permit. According to the Sacred Scriptures, this Holy Spirit is neither the Spirit of the Father alone, nor of the Son alone, but the Spirit of both, and, therefore, He insinuates to us the common love by which the Father and the Son mutually love each other."
15 "And yet," he goes on to say, " it is not without reason that in this Trinity only the Son is called the Word of God, and that only the Holy Spirit is the Gift of God, and that only He, of whom the Son was begotten, and from whom the Spirit principally proceeds, is God the Father. I have added 'principally,' therefore, because the Holy Spirit is also found to proceed from the Son. . . .If, then, The tenuousness of Augustine's line of analysis can be seen in the way he moves by barely perceptible shifts from the idea that the Holy Spirit is "of" both the Father and the Son, which in itself could mean simply that the Son is endowed with the Spirit which is "from" the Father (as the tradition in both East and West generally agreed), to the idea that the Spirit is not just "engendered within" or "abides in"
the Son but is produced by the Son as a distinct source of the Spirit's very being.
It can also be seen in the way his thought has to twist to get around the obvious counterargument that he summarizes as: "If, then, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, why did the Son say: 'He proceeds from the Father?' " (John 15:26). 17 The reasoning of Augustine's answer is patently tortuous: Why do you think, except that He usually referred even what was His to Him, from whom He Himself also is? And for this reason He also says: "My teaching is not my own, but his who sent me." If, therefore, His teaching is understood here, and yet He did not call it His own but His Father's, with how much greater reason ought we to understand that the Holy Spirit also proceeds from Him in that place where He so says: "He proceeds from the Father," as to avoid saying: "He does not proceed from me." But He, from whom the Son has that He is God (for He is God of God), from Him He certainly has that the Holy Spirit also proceeds from Him, and, therefore, the Holy Spirit has from the Father Himself, that He also proceeds from the Son, just as He proceeds from the Father.
18
The last sentence of this passage restates an equally tortuous and tenuous argument from the immediately preceding section that culminated with the obvious nonsequitur: "For if whatever He has, the Son has from the Father, then certainly He has from the Father that the Holy Spirit also proceeds from Him." Augustine's enterprise was rendered all the more speculative by the fact that the authorities he refers to as enjoining this belief were themselves elusive for him, as he indicates in several places. We saw above how he claimed that the double procession was the teaching of scripture but could offer no passage as evidence and had to argue against a straightforward reading of the one text (John 15:26) that addressed the question directly. At the beginning of his Book 2, he spoke of how difficult it is to get a straightforward answer from scripture on these matters: "When men seek after God and direct their mind to the understanding of the Trinity, according to the capacity of human weakness, they learn by experience of the wearisome difficulties that this requires, whether from the eye of the mind trying to look into the inaccessible light, or from the manifold and various modes of speech in the sacred books (where our soul, it seems to me, is only being sorely tried in order that it may find sweetness after it has been glorified [i.e., in the next life] by the grace of Christ). . . ." 22 Regarding other sources of authority, he acknowledged at the beginning of Book 3 that the postscriptural, primarily Greek sources of Catholic tradition regarding the doctrine of the Trinity were not very accessible to him either: ". . . the writings which we have read on these subjects have not been sufficiently explained in the Latin tongue, or they are not available, or at least it was difficult for us to find them; nor are we so familiar with Greek, as to be in any way capable of reading and understanding such books on these subjects in that language, although from the few excerpts that have been translated for us, I have no doubt that they contain everything that we can profitably seek."
23
His discussion, therefore, clearly had the character of a speculation in the dark.
Why, then, undertake it? Because, as he said in the quotation above, it was "by the command" of God-by which he evidently meant that as a Catholic bishop he was responsible both for adhering to and also for promulgating the required faith to all who were obliged to believe it. Before exploring further the implications of the differences between Augustine's conception of the doctrine and that of the Greek Fathers, therefore, it will be worth taking a few moments to consider the pattern of his thought regarding the character of the Church's authority and his own as a bishop.
It is no accident that Augustine would speak of his enterprise here as a matter of "command." It is especially in this aspect of his thought that the role of metaphor in unconsciously guiding the trend of thinking can be seen at work. I earlier quoted
Geertz as saying that "[w]hat a given religion is-its specific content-is embodied in the images and metaphors its adherents use to characterize reality" and Clebsch as speaking of the power of the image of "the Roman imperium" in Christian thought in the Middle Ages. I also said that that this image was no less powerful in the thought 22 2, Pref., p. 51. and there is no other way for the believer concretely to know either the Father or the Son than by way of the presence of that Spirit in his or her own life as well.
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Genuinely to understand the meaning of such images as Father, Son, and Spirit, from this point of view, one must participate in the filial mode of existence that the images speak of.
Augustine's theological epistemology, on the other hand, was entirely different.
Metaphors that for the earlier tradition had seemed transparent, became in Augustine's thinking opaque. For him, concrete knowledge of the Trinity was, as we saw above, impossible in principle for human beings. Rather, as he conceived it, one can only speculate abstractly about the meaning of the trinitarian doctrine, and one believes it not because its imagery speaks to one of experience that is personally recog- Kierkegaard's use of the term "certitude" closely parallels that of his British near-contemporary, John Henry Newman, who discussed certitude in his Grammar of Assent as experientially grounded understanding that provides genuine satisfaction to the reflective intellectual conscience. Both Kierkegaard and Newman contrasted such experientially grounded understanding with the abstractness of speculation uprooted from experience. Such "abstract subjectivity," to use Kierkegaard's phrasing again, becomes anxious and compulsive precisely because of its abstractness-because, that is, whereas rational assent can proceed naturally and spontaneously from critical reflection on the interpretation of experience, when experience is lacking, critical reflection has no material to look to as the ground of interpretation and so cannot confirm it and thereby experience the intellectual satisfaction that springs naturally from such confirmation. In this case one's own assent becomes forced, and from there it is a small step to the attempt to coerce the assent of another. As Newman put it, certitude is "tranquil enjoyment" of truth, an experience of intellectual satisfaction and repose that results from the genuine completion of a process of inquiry, while its opposite is "intellectual anxiety," which produces such symptoms as going over and over arguments as if to conclude what was already supposed to be conclusive and "our unnecessary declaring that we are certain, as if to reassure ourselves, and our appealing to others for their suffrage in behalf of the truths of which we are so sure; which is like asking another whether we are weary and hungry, or have eaten and drunk to our satisfaction."
33 A person whose belief grows out of reflection on his or her experience may come to rest in the "tranquil enjoyment" of concrete knowing that constitutes certitude, but one who tries to force assent on some other basis will go round and round the issue compulsively.
Augustine's De Trinitate shows the marks of thought that lacks certitude in this way. We saw how he began the book with an expression of hope that he might in writing it come "to know these subjects by speaking of them with reverence." The book was sixteen years and over five hundred pages in the writing, during which he tried one version of the psychological analogy after another in the effort to find a satisfactory formulation. And at the end of all that time, he brought the book to a close, as we saw, with arguments so loose in their logic that they could hardly have been satisfying even to him. He also ended it with expressions of inadequacy that might be interpreted as signs of humility, but which also have the ring of real despair: This in turn may well have contributed to the tradition of religious coercion and persecution that became such a prominent feature of Augustine's heritage. We saw how Newman spoke of the anxious mind's concern with unanimity as a kind of "appealing to others for their suffrage in behalf of the truths of which we are so sure."
Peter Berger also, in his discussion of "plausibility structures" as buttresses of belief, has described the tendency of cultures and religious systems to seek unanimity as a means of keeping uncertainty and anxiety at bay, especially when the beliefs are such that critical reason is unable to contribute to their support. Ironically, Augustine's own approach to theology was precisely of a sort to undermine the possibility of the uncoerced and uncompulsive kind of unanimity that could at least in principle develop as a community's mutual understanding of shared experience. By interpreting the symbols of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in a way that would make it impossible to approach the symbol of the Trinity as an explication of the Christian's experience of participation in the filiality of Christ, Augustine was creating for the tradition that followed him a major source of uncertainty and consequently of the kind of anxiety that would inevitably link authority with command and coercion in the generations and centuries that followed.
Jacques Lacan could well have been speaking of the hold of such thought as Augustine's on the imagination of western Christendom when he said of the pyschological force of dominant images in our lives, "Symbols in fact envelop the life of man in a network so total that they join together, before he comes into the world, those who are going to engender him 'by flesh and blood'; so total that they bring to his birth, along with the gifts of the stars, if not with the gifts of the fairies, the shape of his destiny; so total that they give the words that will make him faithful or renegade, the law of the acts that will follow him right to the very place where he is not yet and even beyond his death; and so total that through them his end finds his meaning in the last judgment. . . ." 40 Whatever one may believe about the theological reality of
Original Sin itself, Augustine can be seen to have created a cultural reality of equivalent force and effect in the web of metaphor that he wove with his formulations of the doctrines of Original Sin and the Trinity and of his conception of ecclesiastical authority. Western Christian thinking has been tangled in that web ever since.
40É crits: A Selection, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1977) , p. 68.
